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Abstract: Public leaders face a set of crisis management tasks that are not easy 
to fulfill. It becomes especially challenging in large cities, which bring together 
potentially dangerous technologies and large masses of people. Coping with an 
emerging crisis in this context is a daunting task, if only because of 
infrastructural bottle necks and a lack of available means. What answers do city 
governments produce? For a particular interesting development, we turn to a 
group of French large cities which have seen the emergence of a new form of 
risk management: the integrated risk institute. In this article, we briefly survey 
emerging developments and challenges in these cities and formulate questions 
for a research agenda on urban crisis management. 
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1 Introduction: emerging challenges in the crisis arena 
In contemporary Western societies, public leaders face a set of challenges that together 
constitute the task of crisis management (Boin et al., 2005). They must prevent known 
risks from materialising or at least recognise developing crises in time; once a crisis 
becomes manifest, leaders must make critical decisions and facilitate a coordinated 
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response to minimise the consequences of crisis; they must explain to citizens, victims, 
clients and stakeholders what went wrong and what they could do to manage the crisis; 
they must deal with formal accountability fora and consider what lessons can be learned 
to prevent the crisis from happening again. 
This set of interrelated tasks is not easy to fulfil. It becomes especially challenging in 
urban cities (Rosenthal et al., 1994). Large cities bring together potentially dangerous 
technologies and large masses of people; crises should therefore be considered ‘normal’ 
occurrences (Perrow, 1999). Coping with an emerging crisis is a daunting task, if only 
because of infrastructural bottlenecks and a lack of available means. Learning the right 
lessons is hindered by the complexity of the urban environment: city administrators 
simply do not fully understand the multicultural city and its citizens. 
A number of long-term trends further compound the difficulties experienced by city 
leaders. Three appear especially relevant for contemporary leaders across the 
governmental spectrum:  
1 The growing complexity of social, corporate, industrial, financial, infrastructural and 
administrative systems – and the tight coupling between these systems – produce 
unforeseen disturbances that can assume previously inconceivable shapes and 
proportions (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Perrow, 1999). As the cause of the 
disturbance is unclear, it is easy to make wrong decisions that fuel rather than 
dampen the crisis at hand. 
2 The societal and political climate in which leaders must try to deal with new and 
old crises has made it harder for leaders to deal with system disturbances. Politicians 
and citizens alike display low tolerance for even minor disturbances; the media are 
all too willing to report incidents into crises. Together, these actors force leaders to 
take rapid and often ill-considered decisions that fuel rather than dampen the crisis 
at hand. 
3 The administrative structures of crisis management have become increasingly 
opaque. After the 9/11 and 3/11 events in the USA and Europe, governmental 
responses in many countries have been driven by the so-called ‘centralisation 
reflex’. This drive to redesign administrative structures betrays a fundamental but 
ill-informed belief in symbolic leadership measures. System disturbances, however, 
typically require flexibility, redundancy and resilience (for which these ‘modern’ 
structures have little tolerance). 
This combination of difficult tasks and emerging challenges seems to render obsolete 
traditional ways of organising for crises (Boin and Lagadec, 2000). If this is the case, we 
ask, what answers do urban cities produce? For a particularly interesting development 
we turn to a group of large French cities, which have been wrestling with precisely 
this question. 
2 Local risk management in large French cities1 
In France, a relatively small group of cities has seen the emergence of a new form of risk 
management: the integrated risk institute. The private sector had seen the development of 
integrated risk management. In addition, the national policy ‘Politique de la Ville’ 
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emerged in the early 1990s, which addressed inner-city problems, such as ethical 
integration, urban violence, and housing for the poor in an integrated way.  
A select set of local institutions decided to integrate local risk management issues. 
This integrated risk perspective, which is considered an administrative innovation, exists 
besides the traditional, sectorised perspective that continues to dominate in other cities.2 
This trend towards integrated risk management is set against the backdrop of a 
centralised nation in which new local policies are always considered a step toward 
decentralisation. The French state still sends national civil servants to govern local 
administrative institutions (the ‘préfets’ in the ‘région’ and the ‘départements’) where 
they work both for the national and the local administrative levels. This paradoxical 
situation creates a difficult environment for risk and crisis management. Local risk 
management, after all, requires a clear distribution of responsibilities and a capacity for 
intelligent regulation. 
2.1 The emerging identity of local risk management departments 
In the cities and regions under study, the local risk management departments displayed an 
interpretation of risk and a fitting organisational culture, which, together, can be said to 
constitute a distinct organisational identity. This development appears to be the result of 
deliberate political choice rather than just geographical or geological features. These local 
governments have opted to create an innovative perspective on local risk management. 
They have created their own answer to future crises, because national laws provide little 
guidance to local institutions. 
The observed risk management departments are viewed as a long-term strategic tool 
for urban planning and economic development, as well as an urban technical service. 
Natural and industrial risks are not treated separately; they are integrated in a 
comprehensive civil defense perspective. This perspective relates a variety of risks to the 
emergency services of a city. 
The most interesting development may be the emergence of a shared risk culture 
within these organisations. Tasks are increasingly defined in an interdisciplinary manner. 
Risk and crisis managers used to be the domain of engineers and lawyers. The 
qualifications of these professions no longer suffice, however. Multidisciplinary profiles 
and training are becoming more and more important. The management of contemporary 
and future crises demands a sense of curiosity, an open-minded attitude, flexibility, 
creativity, and, most of all, a capacity for understanding, discussion and negotiation 
among different actors.  
The managers of the departments under discussion are highly motivated to create 
innovative risk management organisations. They are eager to develop their own practices, 
their own ways of working and organising, a professional culture that fits it all. They 
provide the rather abstract national policies with local ‘hands and feet.’ 
If this trend is to be sustained, traditional bureaucrats in city administration must be 
convinced of its potential usefulness. At the local level, a common culture of risk must be 
developed. This requires a political and administrative trajectory of deliberation, 
evaluation, and policy-making. Risk managers typically find the relevance of such a 
project self-evident. But it is not necessarily the case in other parts of the city 
administration; national civil servants and citizens must also be convinced. 
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The departments are still negotiating between traditional bureaucratic structures and 
the requirements of a new crisis management organisation. At the same time, this ‘birth’ 
phase of the new risk departments allows room for innovative approaches and procedures 
that may help to institutionalise flexibility. 
2.2 Challenges of institutionalising a collective risk culture 
This local drive for a shared risk culture runs into barriers. Interpretations differ: some 
local institutions have a very reactive orientation, whereas others emphasise research, 
prevention and forecasting. To complicate matters, city administrations still have 
difficulties with integrated risk approaches. Organisational charts tend to display strict 
functional separations and the administrative reflex to look for standardised methods that 
can be used in different situations remains strong.  
The development of a shared risk culture is further compounded by the strained 
relation between administrators and politicians. Risk experts and managers face various 
problems of cooperation in their relation with local politicians. They lack budgetary, 
technical and human means, but also political and legal support. This gives risk managers 
a feeling of being undervalued. Risk managers also experience a lack of credibility. They 
hesitate between raising risk awareness and underplaying risks (in order not to frighten 
politicians). The lack of meaningful debate between the risk departments, local 
administrations, the other departments and politicians is frequently mentioned as a source 
of concern. 
This rigid relationship does not allow for simple rules and comprehensible 
organisational schemes. The mayor’s responsibility and means as the emergency head, 
whenever risk threatens his commune, are not clearly defined; the resulting relation is 
tense and certainly does not help the construction of a widely shared culture of risk 
management. Local risk management departments have difficulties in defining an 
effective role for the mayor that fits juridical powers, as well as administrative 
responsibilities. The State remains master and the guarantor of the citizens’ safety on 
the whole territory, because of the presence of the prefect and of the different 
devolved services. 
The balance of powers between the mayor and the prefect is yet another factor. The 
mayor has to answer to higher authorities when he intervenes as a representative of the 
State’s authority. However, he only has to abide by the law when he acts as a 
representative of the municipality. His authority is under both political surveillance of the 
municipal council, and the administrative control of the State’s representative prefect. 
The ambiguity can be summed up in the fact that the prefect has a general police 
authority that overlaps the mayor’s municipal police powers. The prefect exerts this 
authority when the mayor cannot deal with the situation or when the endangered territory 
extends the limits of the communes.  
The media complicates matters as they influence the perceived importance of certain 
risks both in the eyes of the general public and on the political scene; it sometimes seems 
as if the only risks that can be treated are the mediatised ones. Risk managers tend to 
agree that transparency is necessary, in order to facilitate informed debate. But it remains 
an open question just how much transparency is needed to have a productive debate. 
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3 An agenda for research 
We have sketched the outlines of an intriguing development: local institutions 
are shaping their response capacity in the face of contemporary and future crises. 
Their efforts are constrained by the ‘normal’ factors of law, culture and 
administrative structure.  
The question is what crisis researchers can do to nurture these developments 
towards an integrative perspective on crisis and risk management. If we consider the 
research findings in the various subfields of crisis research, the following agenda 
for interdisciplinary research – quite a challenge in itself – on crises and crisis 
management emerges: 
• Crisis researchers should demonstrate that urban crises do not follow simple rules of 
causation. Crisis researchers have traditionally formulated middle-range theories for 
specific types of crisis. Hence, serious work can be found, for instance, on prison 
riots, hurricanes, international conflicts and economic adversity. But this 
fragmentation of research findings makes it very hard to produce generic insights 
that policy makers could act upon without encountering unintended consequences of 
their interventions. Crisis researchers need to explore whether a common framework 
can be formulated (or borrowed) that will help to explain the complex causal chain 
that precedes urban crises.3 That may help local crisis managers to build a shared 
risk culture. 
• An additional research challenge pertains to the politics of crisis: why do people 
experience some events as a threat and ignore what may appear to outside observers 
as rather obvious threats? Why do media and politics select from the sea of potential 
issues that particular issue, jointly elevating it to a crisis? Why are some events of 
adversity remembered as time-defining disasters, whereas others disappear in the 
vaults of history? If researchers can develop an understanding of the seemingly 
random way in which people pay attention to risks, threats and adverse events, they 
may help local risk managers to grasp the environment in which politicians must 
make critical calls. It is this understanding that may provide for a better developed 
relation – based on a common understanding – between local risk managers and 
crisis managers. 
• Crisis researchers must make an urgent effort to define, identify and map best 
practices. The problem is the lack of a widely agreed upon normative framework, 
which sets out the tasks of crisis management and prescribes the guiding principles 
for fulfilling those tasks. In the absence of such a framework, the search for best 
practices amounts to little more than a description of heroic leaders and happy crisis 
endings. If researchers can set out such a framework, it can serve as a base for a 
systematic investigation into crisis management performance. 
Fruitful initiatives 
A concerted drive is needed to build a community of crisis researchers who are willing to 
work in a multi-disciplinary effort to further our theoretical knowledge about crises and 
crisis management. This is no easy task. It requires academic engineers who can build 
bridges between the various fields that would have to be connected before we can speak 
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of a crisis field. At the very least, a dialogue must be initiated and sustained among 
disaster sociologists, students of (local) government and international relations, 
geographers and engineers, business students and communication (media) experts. These 
fields harbour developed notions of crisis (or whatever label they use for the threat of 
adversity) that can and should be reconciled. The key initiative would be to bring 
together academic leaders from these various fields and have them collaborate in joint 
research projects. Only through working together do we learn to understand each other. 
Experienced crisis managers remain the untapped source for crucial insights with 
regard to what works and what does not. An interesting initiative, pioneered by Patrick 
Lagadec and his collaborators, is the organisation of debriefings in the wake of crises. 
Providing a friendly but serious setting in which practitioners can reflect upon recent 
events and discuss their strategies and the subsequent outcomes with colleagues, 
stakeholders and academics has proven beneficial to all involved. This initiative deserves 
replication in more countries and in many more sectors. A potential follow-up would be 
the involvement of these practitioners in the design of curriculum, scenarios, and 
simulations from which our future leaders can benefit. 
One of the most persistent sources of dismay in academic circles is the consistent 
disregard for their research findings in policy circles. Time and again, academics see 
policy initiatives that have been proven ineffective in the past (the latest example being 
the colour code warning system in the USA). At the same time, many inventive 
administrators shake their head at the impractical theories forwarded by academics and 
wonder when these same academics will visit them to learn how they try to deal with the 
crises of the future. Academics should remain committed to empirical research, so that 
local inventions do not go unnoticed – to the greater benefit of both practice and theory. 
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Notes 
1 This section draws from Mathilde Gralepois (2004) – The Organisation of Local Risk 
Management in French Public Institutions (Research master report, now the subject of her 
PhD research). The study is on risk managers in the local public institutions of four cities 
(Cannes, Toulouse, Marseille, Lyon) and two ‘urban public communities’ (Nantes Métropole 
and Grand Lyon). 
2 Risk management is organised in more traditional departments, such as ‘Civil security’, 
‘Public Health’ or ‘Environment’. 
3 The rapidly expanding field of complexity theory may hold the promise of delivering such a 
framework. For an introduction to this line of inquiry, see Buchanan (2000). 
